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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
GLEN L. NICEWINTER, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
DAVID H. NICEWINTER and 
. GENEVA C. NICEWINTER, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
MARIE M. DIENER, 
Defendant. 
APPELLANTS-' . REPLY BRIEF 
Case No. 
7669 
In view of the fact that respondent's brief contains 
a point not considered in appellants' brief, a reply may 
prove of possible assistance to the Court. The point, 
appearing at page 17 of respondent's brief, reads as fol-
lows: 
Respondent's Point No. 1 
"JUD-GE VAN COTT'S D-ECREE (R. 30, 31) HERE 
APPEALED FROM IS AN INTERLOCUTORY 
ORDER OR DECISION WITHIN THE PUR-
VIEW OF· 72 (b) OF UTAH- RULES OF· CIVIL 
PROCEDURE. 
Under this point, respondent argues that the judg-
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ment with whic4 this appe~l is conce:rn~d is interlocutory 
in character, and therefore :requires compliance with the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure regarding an appeal from 
a judgment of this type. Lat~r, and in the conclusion of 
his brief, respondent states, page 19, "No order having 
ever been issued authorizing this appeal, respondent 
moves that it be dismissed." This is, apparently, an 
attempt to dismiss the appeal, an attempt which is with-
out merit because: A. no motion is properly before the 
court; B. such a motion may not be made at t4is late 
date; and C. the judgment from which the appeal is taken 
is a final judgment, and full compliance has been made 
with all appellate procedural requirements. In the inter-
ests of clarity, these items will be argued in order. 
A. NO MOTION TO DISMISS IS PROPERLY BEFORE 
THE COURT. 
The attempted motion is based upon technical 
grounds, in that respondent claims there has been a fail-
ure to comply with Rule 72 (b) of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure, which provides that an appeal from an 
interlocutory order may be made by petition to this 
Court, which may grant the petition if the order com-
plained of will invo~ve substantial rights and a determin-
ation of the correctness of the order will better serve the 
interests of justice. Whether this rple is involved 
depends upon whefhe:r or not the judgment is interlocu-
tory or final. It sh9uld be emphasized that the atte·mpted 
motion does not involve any question of jurisdiction. 
In Attorney General of Utah v. p,pmeroy, 93 Utah 
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426, 73 P. ( 2d) 1277, the decision discusses a 1notion to 
disn1iss based upon the ground that judgment was inter-
locutory, at page 450: 
~'* * * This excerpt is given fro1n this old 
\York on pleading to show that it was not jurisdic-
tional with the revie'v court, but a policy of the 
law which \Yas quite uniformly adhered to but not 
inflexible. If the reasoning of the North Point 
Case is correct and our jurisdiction depends on 
the finality of judgments, a decision given by us 
might be nugatory where it was afterward dis-
covered that by inadvertence the judgment ap-
pealed from was not final although no one ques-
tioned it. If our right to pass upon assigned error 
depends upon the finality of the judgment ap-
pealed from and such judgment was not final, any 
decision or opinion we might make would be as if 
it had not been made. 
"In the light of these considerations, we think 
the North Point Case was not based on the proper 
grounds and we hold that section 9 of article 8 
of the Constitution was a guaranty and not a 
restriction on the right of the litigant to appeal. 
Likewise, section 104-41-1, R. S. Utah 1933, was 
intended not to prevent this court from ever 
entertaining an app·eal from other than what is 
technically a final judgment, but was meant to 
assure the right at. all events from final judg-
ments." 
In this case, since jurisdiction is not involved, the 
manner of attempted motion is of importance. The Utah 
Rules of . Civil Procedure provide the manner in which 
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any motion shall be made, in Rule 7 (b) (1) and (4), 
which read as follows: 
" ( 1) Motions. An application to the court 
for an order shall be by motion which, unless 
made during a hearing or trial, shall be made 
in writing, shall state with particularity the 
grounds therefor, and shall set forth the relief 
or order sought. The requirement of writing is 
fulfilled if the motion is stated in a written notice 
of the hearing of the motion." 
" ( 4) Application of Rules to Motions, Orders 
and Other Papers. The rules applicable to cap-
tions, signing, and other matters of form of plead-
ings apply to all motions, orders, and other papers 
provided for by these rules." 
It would seem perfectly obvious that where a party 
merely states in the conclusion of his brief that "he 
moves it be dismissed", there has been a complete fail-
ure to comply with the rules in any respect, and there is 
therefore no motion before the Court which can be con-
sidered. 
B. EVEN IF A MOTION TO DISMISS WERE FILED 
IN PROPER FORM, IT CANNOT BE CONSIDERED BE-
CAUSE NOT PRESENTED WITHIN PROPER TIME. 
The only attempt made to present" this motion is 
found in respondent's brief, which is filed in answer to 
the brief of appellants. The notice of appeal was filed 
on March 9, 1951 (R. 38), almost seven months prior 
to the time of the filing of respondent's brief. On May 
23, 1951, a stipulation extending time for filing of briefs 
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of both parties 'vas signed by them, and an order based 
thereon entered in this Court on the same date. As late 
as September 10, 1951, and at the request of the respond-
ent, both parties stipulated for the correction of a minor 
error in the record. It is of course obvious that appel-
lants' brief had been filed literally n1onths prior to the 
date set for argu1nent before this Court. 
Respondent, if a motion to dismiss upon other than 
jurisdictional grounds was contemplated, should have 
filed the same at least prior to the preparation and filing 
of the appellants' brief. Had this been done, the matter 
could have been set for hearing in proper manner, and 
ruling made thereon. While the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure do not seem to contain any provision relating 
exclusively to the argument on a motion of dismissal on 
appeal, Rule 75 (j) provides for a motion of the type 
here involved prior even to the time the complete record 
is settled and certified. In addition, Rule 7 (b) ( 3) pro-
vides for the manner in which a motion shall be pre-
sented to the c·ourt. In any event, the tenor of these 
rules would indicate the desirability of disposing of such 
a motion at a time prior to the filing of the appellants' 
brief. 
Certainly, this was clear under the provisions of the 
Supreme Court Rules as amended, which were published 
in the May-June 1947 issue of the Utah Bar Bulletin. 
We refer particularly to Rule V, under which rule we 
believe it clear that this attempted motion was not made 
within proper time. 
We are not advised as to whether or not this rule 
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is still in effect. It is true that the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure have incorporated a few of the former Rules 
of the Supreme Court. At the same time, however, it is 
noted that the order of the Supreme Court adopting the 
rules, which appears in the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
at page VI, provides that all laws in conflict with those 
rules shall be of no further force or effect after January 
1, 1950. In addition, the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
provide, at pages 186 and 187, that certain portions of 
Title 20, U.C.A., are superceded, and that all of Title 
104 is revoked except the specifically detailed sections. 
There is no mention of the Rules of the Supreme Court, 
and so far as we can determine, no order has been 
entered specifically annulling those previously in force. 
If this be true, therefore, the-re would seem to be a 
distinct possibility that these rules of 1947, as amended, 
are still in force and effect, except as to any modifica-
tion made in the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and 
since there is no conflict between Rule V and the Rules 
of Civil Procedure, this Rule may still be in effect. 
Apart from these considerations, applicable law 
would seem to indicate that this appeal is not made 
within time. The decision in In Re Sheeler's Estate, 
284 N.W. 799 (Iowa, 1939), states as follows at page 
806: 
"VII. Foft, as executor, and the Fidelity 
& Deposit Company, in their brief and argument, 
served November 17, 1938, in answer to the· brief 
and argument of Champeny, for the first time 
raised the question that the Champeny appeal 
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should be dismissed. The causes for the 21st 
judicial district were set for hearing for N ovem-
ber 23, 1938. If it be conceded to be a motion 
to dismiss the appeal, it 'vas not timely served." 
Again, in Griffith v. Walesby et al., 91 S.W. (2d) 
232 (:Jio., 1936), the Court states at page 234: 
"Aside from this, we do not think that the 
point was timely raised. The cause was set for 
hearing in this court on December 4, 1935. The 
abstracts and briefs were required to be served 
on the respondent 20 days prior to that time. 
The motion to dismiss the appeal was filed on 
November 23, 1935, which was after the abstract 
and brief of appellants were printed and filed in 
this court. The respondent could not have been 
prejudiced by the failure of the affidavit to fol~ 
lo'v exactly the words of the statute and he 
waited until after appellants had gone to the 
expense of printing their brief and abstract before 
raising the point. The motion to dismiss was 
filed too late (Causey v. Wittig, 321 Mo. 358, 11 
S.W. (2d) 11; State ex rel. v. Broaddus, 210 Mo. 
1, 108 S.W. 544) and it is overruled.'' 
See also Cahow v. Hughes, 173 So. 471 (La., 1937). 
C. THE JUDGMENT FROM WHICH THIS APPEAL 
IS TAKEN IS A FINAL JUDGMENT. 
It will be noted that this judgment (R. 30) is based 
upon detailed findings of fact and conclusions of law 
(R. 21), that it provides for the sale of all interest of 
the parties in and to the real and personal property, 
allows a liquidated amount to be available to respondent 
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as cash in bidding, provides manner of notice, vacation 
and deli very of_ the premises to the successful bidder, 
and for deposit of proceeds with Clerk of the Court 
for a later accounting. 
It is submitted that this is a final juq.gment, in the 
sense that the same is used from the standpoint of an 
appeal. 
A Utah case which is closely related from a factual 
standpoint is Benson v. Rozzelle et al., 85 Utah 582, 
39 P. (2d) 1113. There, this Court held that a judgment 
as to certain defendants, or particular issues, or affect-
ing special property, while all other equities as to other 
defendants and claims were reserved for further con-
sideration, may be a final determination for purposes of 
appeal. The c·ourt considered a number of previous 
Utah decisions, and in holding that the case involved a 
final order, summarized applicable law as follows, at 
page 590: 
"This is a case in equity, and whether the 
case be considered upon the appeal or upon the 
application for a writ of review, this court is 
called upon to examine the record. To attempt 
to frame a general definition of what is or is not a 
"final judgment" applicable to all cases possible 
to arise in practice would present an under-
taking not easily accomplished. Many definitions 
have been attempted to define a "final judgment." 
Most of them are criticized as being either too 
specific or too broad in their terms. An inter-
esting discussion of some of such attempts or 
definitions is found in the case of Tucker v. Yell, 
25 Ark. 420, at pages 429-432. This court in the 
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case of K etchuu~ Coal Co. v. Pleasant Valley 
Coal Co. et al., 50 Utah 395, 168 P. 86, 89, ap-
proved what was said in the Tucker v. Yell Case, 
supra, and quoted and approved the statement: 
· .. :\ .. final judgment is not necessarily the last one 
in an action. ..A. judgment that is conclusive of 
any question in a case is final as to that question,' 
found in Sharon v. Sharon, 67 Cal. 196, 7 P. 456, 
463, 635, 8 P. 709, and referred to the cases of 
Bristol v. Brent, 35 Utah 213, 99 P. 1000, and 
other cases as illustrative of the principle. 
"~Iany cases present dual or multiple situa-
tions wherein it is necessary to enter judgment on 
one or more 1natters that are final and appeal-
able, whether or not other matters are treated 
as interlocutory and are reserved for further 
determination. An action for divorce, wherein 
alimony, property adjustments, and counsel fees 
are involved, presents such a situation. A mort-
gage foreclosure involving sale of prope-rty, or 
the appointment of a receiver, and a possible 
deficiency judgment, may involve similar prin-
ciples. 
"The instant case, fundamentally by allega- , 
tion but wanting in proof, charged the exist-
ence of a partnership and sufficient, if such ex-
isted, as to violation of partnership rights to war-
rant dissolution, and as ancillary relief prayed 
for the dissolution of the partnership, the ap-
pointment of a receiver, an accounting, and gen-
eral relief. 
"While no money judgment has in the instant 
case yet been entered, and while the appointment 
of a receiver was denied, the procedure required 
by an accounting certainly contemplates the ex-
amination and valuation of defendants', especially 
Rozzelle's, property, and if the judgment of dis-
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solution of the alleged partnership is valid, the 
court has the undoubted authority to enforce 
the judgment of dissolution by attachment or-
other process to take into custody property, al-
legedly partnership assets, and punish as for con-
tempt for a failure or refusal to so submit prop-
erty, records, or information to the court. 
"It would not be seriously argued that there 
was no right of appeal in a mortgage foreclosure 
until after final sale of the property, the making 
of the sheriff's return under an order of sale, 
and the entry of a deficiency judgment. A single 
illustration will suffice. A brings a suit upon a 
promissory note for $1,000 secured by a real 
estate mortgage. B defends and pleads pay-
ment in full. The court finds payment of $500 
and enters judgment for $500, interest, costs, 
and attorney's fees, and orders foreclosure and 
sale as provided by law. Must B wait until his 
property is sold before he may appeal, or if a 
receiver has been appointed has he no relief 
from either situation if either alone creates a 
situation from which irreparable damage may 
result from the application of one remedy only~ 
"A final order dismissing an action which 
puts one of a number of defendants out of court, 
or directing the sale of certain property, or de-
claring certain property subject to liens or other 
burdens, or directing a final disposition of funds 
in court or in the hands of a receiver, may de-
stroy some of the fundamental rights, some of the 
most vital and important interests, yet there 
may be other parties, other equities, and other 
remedies to be considered, and the trial court 
may have exercised its judgment on only one 
of them." 
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So far as can be determined, there are few Utah 
cases involving similar facts to those presented in this 
case. Ther~ are some from other jurisdictions, however, 
factually similar and following the same general rules 
as the Utah decisions. Childs v. Julian, 2 S.o. (2d) 453, 
was a suit seeking the sale of realty for division among 
joint owners, and for an accounting of the proceeds. 
The decree settled the equities of the parties and refer-
red certain matters of fact touching various interests 
and liabilities of the joint owners to the register for 
further report to the Court. This decree was held final 
for purposes of appeal. 
In Staley v. International Agricultural Corp., 194 
So. 168, a decree which held that moneys co1lected by 
an executor belonged to plaintiff, and that plaintiff had 
a mortgage on the crops of decedent's tenants, was 
deemed final for appeal purposes, even though the decree 
ordered a subsequent account. 
In Simmons v. Turner, 283 S·.W. 47, the decree was 
held a final decree in a suit involving title to land, can-
cellation of instruments of title, and establishing the 
ownership, even though the Court provided for a further 
report of commissioners, who were appointed to par-
tition land, as to rents, improvements, and taxes. 
In this case, there was clearly a final order as it 
decreed a s~le of the property in question, wiped out 
the equities of the parties in the same, and as to this 
phase of the action nothing more remained to be done. 
Since a previous decree had established the existence 
of a joint venture, there remained only an account, a 
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the rights of the parties had been fixed by judicial action. 
c·ertainly, respondent can show no prejudice. Under 
presently existing rules appellant had the right to 
appeal in any event, whether interlocutory or final, and 
the distinction, in a case of this kind, is essentially one 
of mechanics. 
On the other hand, if the judgment of the· lower 
court is allowed to stand, appellant will be prejudicially 
affected by a court ac~ion which could not later be 
corrected. The order of sale as drawn, and as previously 
pointed out, permitted substantial interests of appel-
lants in the property to be destroyed. Once the sale 
was consummated, respondent was free to resell the 
premises. The account in all likelihood could not have 
been completed prior to the expiration ·of the appeal 
period following the judgment of sale. If, as we firmly 
believe, the judgment was final, the appeal period could 
expire before the account could be rendered, with the 
result that a judgment without foundation in fact or 
law, and highly prejudicial to the appellants, would 
remain in force and effect. 
In any event, the Utah c~ses clearly indicate that 
the rule ~f . definition between interlocutory ~nd final 
judgments is one which should not be permitted to impose 
injustice ·or hardship. Thus, in , Attorney General· of 
Utah v. Pomeroy, s~pra, the Court stated at page 471: 
"The principle that only final judgments are 
·appealable rests upon a salutary policy of the 
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law of ancient origin. Cases cannot be brought 
up in parcels. But it being a policy of the law, 
it is not inflexible and should not be invoked 
w·here injustice or hardship would result. The 
very struggle to get away from the inexorability 
of the rule has led to various exceptions. Illinois, 
which has adhered to the general rule, created 
an exception where to deny the appeal would 
amount to great hardship or a denial of justice. 
See note, 80 A.L.R. 1192. Likewise, some of the 
attempted distinctions between severable and 
identical interests of defendants comes from a 
desire to escape the inexorability of the rule." 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, it is submitted that the respondent, 
belatedly and in improper form, seeks to dismiss the 
appeal upon grounds which are without foundation, the 
judgment being final, and that to permit the dismissal 
of the appeal would not only work a hardship on the 
appellant but would be a matter of injustice which could 
not thereafter be adequately remedied. 
Respectfully submitted, 
SKEEN, THURMAN & WORSLEY 
and WILLIAM T. THURMAN, 
Attorneys for Appellants. 
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